Is there a relationship between the prevailing model of agriculture and the structure of the crop and livestock insurance markets? by Soliwoda, Michał et al.
77
https://doi.org/10.7896/j.1702 Studies in Agricultural Economics 119 (2017) 77-84
Introduction
Given the strong dependence of its economic results on 
natural factors (for example, weather-related factors), agri-
culture is characterised by high exposure to risk. Farmers 
face both weather and disease risks, of which the former, 
especially drought, have been more signiﬁ cant in recent 
years (Potop et al., 2010). Moreover, shifts in agricultural 
commodity demand and supply have led to relatively strong 
volatility of agricultural/agrifood prices. This shows that 
there is a real need to develop new or modify existing risk 
management tools (Meuwissen et al., 2001; Meuwissen et 
al., 2006). Insurance is one of the few ﬁ nancial management 
tools that can mitigate risks in agriculture (Šturcová, 2013).
The topic of agricultural insurance is complex from three 
perspectives: the state, the insurance sector and farmers. 
This paper explores the relationship between the prevailing 
‘model of agriculture’ in a country and the methods of risk 
management (in particular insurance schemes) adopted. It 
compares the situation in the Czech Republic, where agri-
culture is oriented to large-sized industrial farming, with that 
of Poland, where it has a bipolar structure that includes both 
small, family-owned farms and large agricultural holdings. 
Various approaches to agricultural insurance schemes may 
arise from the diﬀ erent models of agriculture that prevail. In 
this paper, particular attention is paid to the perspective of 
agricultural policy in both countries.
Following a brief introduction to crop and livestock 
insurance, we compare, using Farm Accountancy Data 
Network (FADN) data from 2009 and 2015, the income 
and ﬁ nancial situation of agricultural holdings in the Czech 
Republic and Poland. Then, we consider diﬀ erent models of 
agricultural insurance. We compare the situations in the crop 
and livestock insurance markets (both from the perspective 
of demand and supply side), with particular attention to the 
issue of subsidisation. In-depth analysis has been conducted 
at the sectoral level on the basis of statistical data from 2009 
to 2015 provided by supervision authorities and/or ministries 
of agriculture. We conclude with political recommendations 
and suggestions for future research.
Crop and livestock insurance
Crop and livestock insurance are purchased by farmers 
as forms of ﬁ nancial loss protection. State-subsidised crop 
insurance programmes strengthen existing components of 
farming safety nets (Shields, 2015). There is a growing body 
of literature on subsidised crop and livestock insurance, 
particularly in the United States and Canada where devel-
oped systems of agricultural insurance with a relatively high 
degree of subsidisation exist. For example, the demand for 
crop insurance in the United States has been explored by 
Glauber et al., (2002), Sherrick et al. (2004) and Goodwin 
and Smith (2013). Some European countries (such as Spain, 
Italy and France) have also adopted various solutions (partly 
subsidised) for risk management in agriculture. Empiri-
cal studies dealing with determinants of crop insurance in 
Europe include Enjolras and Sentis, 2011; Špička and Vil-
helm, 2012; Pawłowska-Tyszko et al., 2015 and Santeramo 
et al., 2016.
As Santeramo et al. (2016, p.640) observed, policy mak-
ers, irrespective of the country, “often act to encourage par-
ticipation in crop insurance programmes, most often through 
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the use of large subsidies”. The question of subsidising agri-
cultural (crop and or/livestock) insurance systems depends on 
various factors, including the share of agriculture in GDP and 
the percentage of the citizens in a country that live in rural 
areas (Du et al., 2016). Santeramo et al. (2016, p.653) noted 
that “although subsidised crop insurance programmes con-
tinue to proliferate around the world, participation remains 
sporadic and not well understood in many cases”. They added 
(p.653) that a signiﬁ cant increase in subsidised crop insur-
ance may be stimulated by “the factors that lead a farmer to 
adopt insurance and to remain insured”. An entrepreneur’s 
receptiveness to agricultural insurance is inﬂ uenced, among 
other factors, by his/her attitude towards risk (Ginder et al., 
2009). Signiﬁ cant risk aversion may lead to the loss of com-
petitive ability and subsequent withdrawal from the market.
Enjolras and Sentis (2011) identiﬁ ed the following key 
groups of determinants of demand for crop insurance: (a) 
environmental variables; (b) ﬁ nancial variables (related to 
capital structure, ﬁ nancial liquidity); (c) variables related to 
farm organisation and management; and (d) variables related 
to options of agricultural policies (including the impact of 
subsidies on premiums for/of crop and livestock insurance). 
In particular, a change in subsidising a crop insurance sys-
tem may increase the number of farmers who are able to buy 
multi-peril crop insurance (MPCI). Only a few empirical 
studies evaluate the impact of farm size as a determinant of 
participation in insurance markets. In Italy there are regional 
diﬀ erences (northern vs. southern regions) in demand for 
crop insurance products (Santeramo et al., 2016). This may 
be explained by the fact that insurance premium rates are 
diﬀ erent and ‘the typical loss ratio’ is closer to unity. Several 
research papers on the issue of mainly crop (less commonly 
livestock) insurance have focused on the demand side. Good-
win et al. (2004), Goodwin and Smith (2013) and Yu et al. 
(2016) looked at dependencies between premium subsides 
and crop area insured. Some empirical studies (e.g. Goodwin 
et al., 2004; Goodwin and Smith 2013; Weber et al., 2015) 
referred to key insurance issues such as risk aversion, infor-
mation asymmetry and credit market imperfection.
Agriculture in the Czech Republic 
and Poland
The agricultural sectors in the Czech Republic and Poland 
diﬀ er as a consequence of their contrasting models of devel-
opment, as well as due to socio-demographic determinants 
(greater preference for quasi-social farming in Poland). The 
basic characteristics of the agricultural holdings indicate 
higher-level intensiﬁ cation in the Czech Republic (Table 1). 
Moreover, the average economic size of a farm is around ten 
times larger in the Czech Republic, the total labour input per 
farm is more than four times greater, and the average farm 
land area in the Czech Republic is more than ten times higher. 
This may indicate not only higher capital intensity and larger 
scale of agricultural production. In the Czech Republic more 
than 75 per cent of agricultural land (mainly utilised agricul-
tural area) was rented, which is also associated with the dom-
inance of agricultural holdings in the form of legal entities.
Table 2 presents the overall income and ﬁ nancial situation 
of agricultural holdings in the Czech Republic and Poland. 
The gross farm income of Polish agricultural holdings was on 
average only one tenth of that in the Czech Republic. Moreo-
ver, the average value of farm assets in Poland amounted 
to around EUR 170,000 in 2015, whereas in the Czech 
Republic it was about four times higher. The subsidy rate 
(expressed as the ratio of total subsidies to total output) was 
higher in Czech Republic. However, a signiﬁ cant decrease 
was noted in both countries over the period 2009-2015. This 
may be explained by diﬀ erences in price scissors that lead to 
diﬀ erent dynamics of total output (Seremak-Bulge, 2016). It 
should be noted that self-ﬁ nancing has played a signiﬁ cant 
role in the case of averaged farm household in Poland. The 
debt-to-assets ratio of Czech agricultural holdings (mainly 
corporates) exceeded 10 per cent both in 2009 and 2015.
Table 1: Economic situation of agricultural holdings in the Czech 
Republic and Poland, 2009 and 2015.
2009 2015
CZ PL CZ PL
No. farms represented 
[SYS02] 14,860 725,670 17,210 735,170
Economic size 
[SE005] (EUR 000) 242 24 251 28
Total labour input
[SE010] (AWU) 6.74 1.70 5.62 1.64
Rented UAA [SE030] / 
Total UAA [SE025] (%) 84.6 29.3 77.3 25.6
Total UAA [SE025] (ha) 226.1 18.4 204.4 18.5
Total output: crops and 
crop production
[SE135] (EUR)
122,369 11,215 164,244 15,065
Total output: livestock 
and livestock products
[SE206] (EUR)
91,519 10,413 107,215 12,673
Total livestock output / 
LU [SE207] 887.7 780.1 1170.9 1042.3
Gross farm income 
[SE410] (EUR) 106,329 12,073 151,053 14,800
AWU: annual work unit; LU: livestock unit; UAA: utilised agricultural area; data from 
2015 are preliminary
Data source: Farm Accountancy Data Network
Table 2: Income and ﬁ nancial situation of agricultural holdings in 
the Czech Republic and Poland, 2009 and 2015.
2009 2015
CZ PL CZ PL
No. farms represented 
[SYS02] 14,860 725,670 17,210 735,170
Gross farm income 
[SE410] (EUR) 106,329 12,073 151,053 14,800
Farm net income / FWU
[SE430] 11,230 4,279 16,365 5,709
Total assets
[SE436] (EUR)
739,401 134,133 670,476 169,937
Debt-to-assets ratio (%) 15.0 4.9 30.2 5.7
Total subsidies excluding 
on investments
[SE605] (EUR)
76,336 5,164 83,951 5,136
Subsidy rate: total 
subsides-to-total output-
ratio (%)
15.4 9.8 27.6 18.2
FWU: family working unit
Data source: Farm Accountancy Data Network
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Models of agricultural insurance
Table 3 provides a comparison of the insurance schemes 
in the Czech Republic and Poland. Trends in the agricultural 
insurance markets in these countries are enumerated with 
short explanations. Selected areas related to the demand and 
supply sides of agricultural insurance are highlighted.
In the Czech Republic, agricultural insurance has been 
Table 3: Agricultural insurance systems in the Czech Republic and Poland – comparison and trends
Topic Czech Republic Poland
Risk factors Crop insurance: hail, ﬁ re, storm, ﬂ ood, landslide, winter frost 
damage, and/or for some crops spring frost damage, and/or for 
vine frost damage; drought and rains during harvest are excluded.
Livestock insurance: contagious diseases, other mass diseases, 
injury or death caused by electrical injury or caused by an elec-
tricity outage, loss, death or abstraction of farm animals as a 
consequence of ﬂ ooding, poisoning, overheating of animal or-
ganism, individual losses.
Crop insurance: As in the Czech Republic (similarities due to 
very similar climates), but the risk of drought is increasingly 
perceptible.
Livestock insurance: contagious diseases and selected ill-
nesses, hurricane, ﬂ ood, lighting strike, avalanche, landslide, a 
sudden fatal accident, robbery during transport.
Legal basis of 
subsidisation
Crop/livestock insurance compulsory until 1990 but since 1991 
voluntary on a contract-to-contract basis. Since 2001 there has 
been increasing interest in purchasing crop/livestock insurance. 
State subsidies for insurance schemes have existed since 2004.
Subsidies for crop and livestock insurance premiums (Law of 7 
July 2005). Contracts are implemented in accordance with the 
state budget set out in the Budget Act, Part 32 – Agriculture.
Degree of 
subsidisation (from 
the perspective of 
farmers)
Fifty per cent of the premium paid for livestock insurance as 
well as for crop insurance. Special crops (e.g. grape, hop, fruit, 
vegetable, ornamental plants) are eligible for higher rates of sub-
sidy (up to 70 per cent).
Maximum 65 per cent of premiums paid by farmers. Addition-
ally, the amount of subsidies to premiums strictly depends on 
the sum insured (the upper limit is set by the Executive Acts).
Eligibility criteria for 
obtaining subsidies
• Fulﬁ lling strict requirements as for SME, consequently fam-
ily farms may receive subsidies relatively easily.
• The amount of the premium is determined by the yield of 
insured crops per hectare, the insured price chosen, the area of 
the insured crop, the type of insurance chosen and the agreed 
amount of farmer’s contribution. It will also be aﬀ ected by the 
amount of the bonus.
• Premium rates vary according to crop type and type of insur-
ance. The premium is always calculated for the entire calen-
dar year and its amount is not changed. The premium for the 
insurance contract is the sum of the premium for the indi-
vidual. In insurance for individual crops, rates are increased 
by 50 per cent, i.e. the basic rate is multiplied by 1.5. The 
client can also choose to participate in percentages (0, 10 or 
25 per cent).
• Contract with insurance companies that entered into an agree-
ment with Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development.
• Subsidies to insurance premiums cannot exceed 65 per cent 
of the amount of premiums. The upper limit depends on the 
sum insured (currently 3.5 or 5 per cent depending on the 
type of plant).
• This subsidy represents 60 per cent of the diﬀ erence between 
the total amount of claims paid in respect of drought and the 
amount representing 90 per cent of the silent contributions in 
the case of damage caused by drought. In the case of non-use, 
the amount can be used to increase the funds earmarked for 
subsidies to insurance premiums for crops and livestock.
Supply side: the 
structure of the 
insurance market
Similar to oligopolistic competition:
Česká pojišťovna; Generali Pojišťovna; Agra pojišťovna; Ha-
sičská vzájemná pojišťovna.
Similar to oligopolistic competition, although some ﬁ rms have a 
relatively small share of the market:
PZU (dominant, state-owned insurance ﬁ rm); Towarzystwo 
Ubezpieczeń Wzajemnych; Concordia Polska Towarzystwo 
Ubezpieczeń Wzajemnych; Pocztowe Towarzystwo Ubezpie-
czeń Wzajemnych; InterRisk Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń SA 
Vienna Insurance Group.
Transfer of subsidy 
from the state to 
farmers
• Agricultural producers must submit an electronic applica-
tion on the website of the Support and Guarantee Fund for 
Farmers and Forestry (PGRLF), the operating body for public 
subsidies for agri-food and forestry economy.
• Direct transfers of subsidies to insurance companies (on the 
basis of Executive Acts) are based on the bilateral farmer-to-
insurer agreement.
• Subsidies to an insurer paid once per quarter, on the basis of a 
request made by the insurance company.
• Insurance companies which have concluded an agreement on 
subsidies and/or contracts of compulsory insurance of crops 
and entered into a co-insurance agreement are entitled to a 
special purpose subsidy to cover part of the compensation 
paid to farmers for losses caused by drought.
Stimulants /
constraints on a 
farmer’s decision to 
buy insurance
• The structure of the insurance market decides on prices and 
quality of crop/livestock insurance.
• Bonus system oﬀ ered by insurance ﬁ rms.
• Taking into account the dominance of farms that are legal 
entities, active attitude to risk management (as is typical for 
non-agricultural business) is preferred.
• Discount on insurance premiums in the form of a refund of 
part of the premium paid.
• Obligation on the farmer to insure a minimum of 50 per cent 
of the crop comes from the regulations on direct payments.
• In the case of very low penalties (EUR 2 for each uninsured 
hectare) there would be a lower risk aversion towards this 
type of insurance.
Future perspectives • A need for setting up a fund for covering catastrophic risks 
which cannot be managed by farmers or insurance companies 
– that may be explained by a strong need to reduce budget 
expenditures on ad hoc payments.
• Crop and/or livestock insurance in the packages for farmers: 
ﬁ nancial and insurance conglomerates oﬀ ers packages that 
include both ﬁ nancial and insurance service (cross-selling), 
moreover, agricultural insurance products are not a signiﬁ cant 
part of portfolio of insurance and ﬁ nancial ﬁ rms.
• Higher amount of public subsidy to premium – reasons 
explored by political economy (in Poland farmers are rela-
tively important in election process).
• Including risk of drought in MPCI. However, inclusion of this 
risk results in a signiﬁ cant increase of the insurance rate (even 
MPCI insurance companies have been reluctant to oﬀ er crop 
insurance against drought, implementing new regulations has 
changed this situation).
Source: own compilation
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voluntary since 1991 on a contract-to-contract basis. There is 
market competition on prices and quality of services among 
the four main insurance companies oﬀ ering agricultural 
insurance (Česká pojišťovna, Generali Pojišťovna, Agra 
pojišťovna, Hasičská vzájemná pojišťovna). Altogether there 
were six insurance companies, ﬁ ve of which are joint stock 
companies and one is the organisational unit of the Austrian 
Hail Insurance company, oﬀ ering crop or livestock insurance 
on the Czech agricultural insurance market in 2015, but there 
is no independent body that ﬁ xes tariﬀ s in the Czech market. 
Agricultural insurance has become more popular since 2001 
due to the introduction of a new state support subsidy for insur-
ance programmes. The national subsidies have been processed 
by the Support and Guarantee Fund for Farmers and Forestry. 
Support is granted to agricultural businesses complying with 
the parameters of an SME. Crop insurance is a more signiﬁ cant 
part of the Czech agricultural insurance market than livestock 
insurance, because both the share of crop compensation pay-
ments and the share of crop premiums written exceeded the 
ﬁ gures for farm animals. Nevertheless, agricultural insurance 
is not a signiﬁ cant source of income for insurance companies. 
In recent years, agricultural insurance has often been sold in a 
complex package of ﬁ nancial products.
In Poland, according to the Law of 7 July 2005 on subsi-
dies to crop and livestock insurance premiums, contracts are 
implemented in accordance with the Budget Act, Part 32 – 
Agriculture. The state has also provided for the possibility of 
granting speciﬁ c subsidy to cover part of the compensation for 
the damage caused by drought (Figure 1). These expenses are 
covered from the Budget Act, Part 83 – Provisions. The num-
ber of insurance contracts concluded by farmers is limited by 
the amount of subsidies allocated to the insurance company. 
The conclusion of the bilateral farmer-to-insurer agreement 
is followed by the payment of the contribution paid by the 
farmer to the insurer and the payment of subsidies by the min-
ister responsible for agriculture. Subsidies are therefore part 
of insurance premiums owed to the insurance companies.
Table 4: Crop and livestock insurance in the Czech Republic and Poland from the perspective of the sector (EUR), 2009-2015.
Description 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Change 
2015/2009
Czech Republic
No. crop insurance contracts 3,564 3,836 4,127 4,128 4 246 4,304 4,693 1.32
Sum insured (EUR million) no data
Amount of insurance premiums receivables 
for insurance ﬁ rms (EUR million) 29.6 34.4 39.8 40.4 39.8 37.4 37.2 1.26
therein: the sum of subsidy to premiums 
(EUR million)
13.5 15.4 17.1 8.9 9.0 8.8 16.1 1.19
No. livestock insurance contracts 2,210 2,165 2,290 2,172 2,146 2,172 2,150 0.97
Sum insured (EUR million) no data
Amount of insurance premiums receivables 
for insurance ﬁ rms (EUR million) 10.1 10.0 10.1 9.5 9.2 8.8 8.9 0.88
therein: the sum of subsidy to premiums 
(EUR million)
3.3 3.3 3.2 2.4 2.9 2.8 3.3 0.99
Area of insured crops (000 ha) 1,412 1,495 1,501 1,500 1,600 1,600 n.d.
Poland
No. crop insurance contracts 144,080 134,986 138,425 135,707 151,101 142,492 139,108 0.97
Sum insured (EUR million) 1,501 1,964 2,485 2,888 3,391 3,184 3,273 2.18
Amount of insurance premiums receivables 
for insurance ﬁ rms (EUR million) 40.6 51.2 66.0 84.8 89.3 84.9 89.5 2.21
therein: the sum of subsidy to premiums 
(EUR million)
18.4 24.1 30.7 38.0 39.1 38.5 41.7 2.25
No. livestock insurance contracts 248 279 290 292 307 426 477 1.92
Sum insured (EUR million) 8,782 12,243 13,710 18,891 24,581 57,705 57,260 6.52
Amount of insurance premiums receivables 
for insurance ﬁ rms (EUR million) 29.6 39.8 48. 6 59.9 78.1 166.2 164.0 5.55
therein: the sum of subsidy to premiums 
(EUR million) 13.8 19.4 22.8 29.4 38.5 83.0 81.6 5.92
Area of insured crops (000 ha) 2,808 2,846 3,033 2,751 3,399 3,270 2,824 1.01
No. insured livestock units 235,005 689,200 1,245,670 2,079,000 4,073,830 13,300,000 13,115,432 55.81
Data sources: CZ: reports of Czech agriculture, ČAP (Czech Insurance Association), Agra pojišťovna, PGRLF (Support and guarantee fund for agriculture and forestry); PL: 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (based on reports of insurers)
Indemnities
Premium
INSURANCE
COMPANYState Farmer
Requests for subsidy to premiums
Payment of premiumsPayment of subsidy to premiums
Requests for indemnity
Payment of indemnity
Bilateral contract
Contract for subsidised
insurance product
Figure 1: Flow of premium subsidies for crop and livestock 
insurance in Poland.
Source: own composition based on the Law on insurance of agricultural crops and 
livestock of 2005
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There are no simple regulations in either country concern-
ing the maximum rate that makes farmers eligible to receive 
public aid. For example, in Poland the maximum amount of 
subsidy is limited by the percentage of sum insured. A spe-
cial fund that operates payments of subsidies to premiums 
is a key feature of the Czech agricultural insurance system.
Subsidised crop and livestock insur-
ance systems
Quantitative data on the level of crop and livestock 
insurance activity in the Czech Republic and Poland are pre-
sented in Table 4. Monetary values (e.g. the sum insured) are 
expressed in EUR, with exchange rates shown in Annex 1.
Both the number of crop insurance contracts and the 
amount of insurance premiums receivables for insurance 
companies have been increasing over a long period in the 
Czech Republic. According to Land Parcel Information Sys-
tem (LPIS) data, in 2015 the share of insured area to utilised 
agricultural land was 59 per cent. Approximately 1,500,000 
hectares of crops were insured. Crop insurance has been 
subsidised in the Czech Republic. The loss ratio is much 
more volatile in the crop production sector than in livestock 
production because the crop yields and quality are directly 
aﬀ ected by adverse weather condition (Ashenbrenner, 2010). 
The public subsidy for insured farmers has changed in recent 
years, and was 50 per cent of the premium in 2015 (MZ, 
2016). Unlike the crop insurance market, the livestock insur-
ance market has been relatively stable in recent years. There 
were 2,146 livestock insurance contracts in 2009 and 2,290 
in 2015. The highest insurance penetration rate (over 80 per 
cent) is recorded in cattle insurance; the penetration rate in 
insurance of pigs and poultry is lower. The public subsidy 
for insured farmers in 2015 was 50 per cent of premium paid 
for livestock insurance in the Czech Republic as well as for 
crop insurance (MZ, 2016). Regarding the risk of livestock 
disease in the Czech Republic, the share of livestock insured 
has been around 80 per cent in recent years.
In Poland in the period 2009-2015 the number of ‘quasi-
voluntary’ crop insurance policies (i.e. Polish farmers are 
obliged to insure a minimum of 50 per cent of the area sown; 
this results from the directives on direct payments, but in 
practice is only rarely enforced) averaged approximately 
141,000 per year (Table 4). The number of crop insurance 
policies and the total sum insured peaked in 2013. Moreover, 
there was a more than two-fold increase in gross premiums 
collected from policyholders in the period 2009-2015. That 
resulted in a nearly two-fold increase in the amount paid in 
premiums and the share of subsidies to crop insurance pre-
miums averaged 45.6 per cent, which practically corresponds 
to the statutory subsidising level for such instruments. The 
average share of subsidies for livestock insurance premiums 
in the analysed period amounted to 48.6 per cent. In the 
period 2009-2015, approximately 3 million hectares of crops 
were insured, representing around 20 per cent of the sown 
area. A notable drop in insured area was reported in 2015 
which may be the result of a lack of foresight by the farm-
ers not treating insurance as a risk management tool. The 
favourable weather conditions for agriculture in 2013-2014 
may have made farmers complacent about buying insurance. 
This fall in crop insurance occurred alongside an increase in 
the number of insured animals. In the period 2009-2015 the 
total received insurance premiums in the agricultural sector 
(voluntary and mandatory) amounted to approximately EUR 
152 million, including voluntary contributions accounting 
for approximately 24 per cent (EUR 37 million). A similar 
trend can be seen in the voluntary insurance market. The 
largest annual sums of compensation for compulsory insur-
ance and voluntary (EUR 102-154 million) were paid in the 
years 2010-2012. In the 2013-2015 period, the value of these 
claims amounted to approximately EUR 62.0-65.5 million. 
The largest sum of compensation, EUR 112.9 million, was 
Table 5: Premium, indemnities and loss ratio for crop and livestock insurance in the Czech Republic and Poland (EUR), 2009-2015.
Description 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Change 
2015/2009 or 
2015-2009
Czech Republic
Sum of premium collected – all crop and 
livestock insurance (EUR million) 39.7 44.4 49.9 49.9 49.1 46.2 46.1 1.16
Total sum of indemnities paid - all crop and 
livestock insurance (EUR million) 51.0 29.1 26.0 46.1 38.9 27.1 16.8 0.33
Total loss ratio (%) 128.3 65.4 52.0 92.4 79.2 58.6 36.3 -92.0
Poland
Sum of premium collected – all agricultural 
business insurance (EUR million) 120.6 138.3 155.6 156.2 156.2 159.8 176.5 1.46
therein: voluntary crop and livestock 
insurance 21.8 28.3 40.1 43.4 39.0 39.2 44.5 2.04
Total sum of indemnities paid - all agricul-
tural business insurance (EUR million) 51.4 150.6 102.6 154.5 61.9 65.1 65.5 1.27
therein: voluntary crop and livestock 
insurance
17.9 16.3 49.1 112.9 20.0 27.6 19.0 1.06
Total loss ratio (%) 42.6 108.9 66.0 98.9 39.6 40.8 37.1 -5.5
Loss ratio for voluntary crop and livestock 
insurance (%) 82.2 57.5 122.3 260.0 51.2 70.4 42.8 -39.4
Note: the total loss ratio (%) is the ratio of the total sum of indemnities paid – all agricultural business insurance to the sum of premium collected – all agricultural business insur-
ance; the loss ratio for voluntary crop and livestock insurance (%) refers respectively to this aggregated group of insurance
Data sources: CZ: see Table 4; PL: reports of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
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paid in 2012. This situation signiﬁ cantly impacted the gross 
damage ratio.
At 108.9 per cent, i.e. a 66.3 percentage point deteriora-
tion from the previous year, the total loss ratio in the market 
of agricultural insurance in Poland was the highest in 2010 
(Table 5). This change did not occur due to the increase in 
the damage ratio of subsidised voluntary insurance, because 
a substantial increase in subsidised insurance damage ratio 
was noted in 2011-2012. A similar trend occurred in Hun-
gary (Kemény et al., 2012). The situation in the crop and 
livestock insurance market is very unstable, which aﬀ ected 
a strong ﬂ uctuation in the gross damage ratio. In the period 
2009-2015, compensation paid by insurers (EUR 262 mil-
lion) exceeded premiums collected (EUR 256 million). The 
biggest impact on the overall result was seen in 2012, due 
to the large number of compensation payments throughout 
the severe winter. It should be noted that the problem of 
spring frosts is important, particularly in Polish horticulture 
(Kaczała and Wisniewska, 2015).
In both countries, strong ﬂ uctuations in the gross loss 
ratios (the Czech Republic from 36.3 to 128.3 per cent; in 
Poland 39.6 to 108.9 per cent) indicate the need for periodic 
‘monitoring’ of regulations on agricultural insurance and, if 
necessary, changes to the subsidy system.
Discussion
Accession to the European Union (EU) has meant mak-
ing some changes to agricultural risk management tools in 
Poland and the Czech Republic. In both countries, there has 
been an improvement in the economic and ﬁ nancial situations 
of farmers (Pawlas, 2015). The Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) has underlined the link between rural economies and 
the environment. That resulted in the transfer of innovations 
to the region (Jedlička et al., 2014). Agricultural insurance is 
a very important part of the risk management scheme in the 
Czech Republic. The system has two functions: it is socially 
beneﬁ cial through reducing the risks associated with agricul-
tural production, ensuring more stable incomes for farmers, 
and thus contributes to the stability of rural areas (Vávrová, 
2010). The demand for private risk management instruments 
depends strongly on several variables, and the degree of pub-
lic support (subsidies to premiums) still seems to be crucial 
(EP, 2016). The system of crop and livestock insurance in 
Poland is strongly subsidised and covers only 30 per cent of 
the area sown, whereas the situation in the Czech Republic 
seems to be quite the opposite.
The crop and livestock markets in both countries (regard-
less of diﬀ erences in the scale of production of the agricul-
tural sector or microeconomic intensity and eﬃ  ciency) 
strongly depended on public support in the form of subsi-
dies. It should be noted that the issue of subsidised premiums 
to crop and livestock insurance at country level is aﬀ ected 
by determinants related to the competitiveness of the agri-
cultural sector at both the international and EU levels. Risk 
management schemes have been a policy issue and recipi-
ents of public support for a long time: the maximum tariﬀ s 
were ﬁ xed after the WTO Uruguay Round Agreement on 
agriculture in 1995 (Špička, 2010). The importance of risk 
management tools (inter alia, crop and livestock insurance 
products) will increase in the near future. Given the ﬁ scal 
sustainability at EU and Member State level, after 2020 
the role of income support from Pillar I of the CAP may 
be weakened. This means that crop and livestock insurance 
will receive special attention from policy makers. Given the 
criticism of the CAP budget in terms of its function of redis-
tribution, national agricultural policy measures would more 
actively be engaged by the Czech Republic and Poland. 
Despite signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences both in the demand and sup-
ply sides of the crop and livestock insurance markets, subsi-
dised crop insurance products in particular, accompanied by 
ad hoc payments (if necessary), are regarded as an important 
component of the farming safety net in both countries. How-
ever, taking into account the necessity of balancing the bud-
get, excessive support for these two risk management tools 
(in particular ad hoc disaster payments) is questionable from 
the point of view of social justice. The United States experi-
ence (vide: The 2014 Farm Bill) shows that the elimination 
of direct payments resulted in a notable expansion of price 
risk management instruments, as well as subsidised crop 
insurance (Shields, 2015). Diﬀ erences in models of agri-
cultural development result in diﬃ  culties in the adoption of 
relatively uniform (with only a small number of alternative 
options) risk management tools.
Since, in the Czech Republic, signiﬁ cant power is held 
by large agricultural holdings and, compared to the agrarian 
structure in Poland, family farms are not so dominant, the 
risk exposure is not equal for all farms. Špička and Vilhelm 
(2012) found that there is a diﬀ erence between categories 
between the yield risk character and price risk at farm level. 
The risk of price ﬂ uctuation has a generally more system-
atic character and is diversiﬁ ed in a more diﬃ  cult way. On 
the other hand, the yield risk is more speciﬁ c. Moreover, the 
eﬃ  ciency of crop production insurance (measured by total 
loss ratios) is higher in small enterprises specialised in ﬁ eld 
production than in the largest enterprises. Small farms which 
are typical for specialised production generally face a higher 
risk of income variability than large farms with mixed type 
of farming. The insurance eﬃ  ciency in the largest agricul-
tural enterprises in the Czech Republic is low and insurance 
represents for these enterprises’ costs rather than beneﬁ ts due 
to the distribution of risk over a large and diverse territory. 
As for livestock production, the negative trend in insurance 
premiums written for farm animals has been caused by 
the long-term decline in the number of farm animals. This 
decline surpassed the fall in the insurance premiums writ-
ten, which corresponds to a stable proportion of livestock 
insured. An important issue in livestock insurance in the 
Czech Republic is the extent to which it can inﬂ uence farm 
behaviour. Meuwissen et al. (2006) considered incentives 
for risk management when designing epidemic insurance. 
They concluded that classifying farms based on their epi-
demic disease risk and use of deductibles was an important 
step in aligning incentives with policy goals.
In Poland, falls in purchases of crop insurance (e.g. since 
2013 there has been a signiﬁ cant decrease in the purchase 
of crop insurance policies) is especially alarming. This situ-
ation may have occurred due to the high prices of this type 
of policy (Pawłowska-Tyszko, 2015). The problem currently 
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Annex
Annex 1: Currency exchange rates 2009-2015.
Exchange rate 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
PLN/EUR  4.33  3.99  4.12  4.19  4.20  4.19  4.18
CZK/EUR 26.45 25.29 24.59 25.14 25.97 27.53 27.28
Data source: annual averaged data of national banks
